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INTRODUCTION
Of all the questions about why the recent financial mess happened, the most perplexing have to do with the immense risk taken
on by supposedly sophisticated financial institutions.1 There were
many different kinds of transactions that shifted subprime mortgage
† Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
This Essay is an extension of the Day Family Ethics Lecture given at Cornell University in
April, 2010. My thanks to Claire Hill, Dana Radcliffe, Mitt Regan, Avishalom Tor, attendees at the Day Lecture at Cornell, and workshop participants at the University of Western Ontario for their comments and suggestions.
1
Various commentators provide helpful overviews of the crisis and its institutional
and regulatory context. See generally Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and
Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 77, 82–98 (2009) (providing an event logbook
of the 2007–2008 financial crisis and discussing the amplifying mechanisms that can turn
shocks into financial meltdowns); Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 10,
12–37 (2009) (describing the intricate chain of risk distribution that lead to the financial
panic); Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16–36
(2010) (tracing the evolution and regulation of financial markets and explaining how such
changes led to riskier behavior by financial intermediaries).
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risk from originators to end-of-the-line buyers.2 Most of it moved rapidly into securitization vehicles or derivatives and then into the portfolios of institutional investors—banks, pension funds, mutual funds,
hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds and the like—around the world.3
However, financial middlemen—large investment banks like Lehman,
Bear Stearns, and Citigroup—retained some of the risk either by design4 or because they could not fully sell off these instruments by the
time the downturn suddenly hit in 2007.5
How did the distributors so easily sell so much risk, and why did
institutional buyers so willingly take it? Tentative answers fall into
three general categories, each of which takes complexity—of the
products, the firms, and the financial system generally—as a starting
point.6 The first category of explanations claims that neither buyers
nor sellers (nor their facilitators, like the credit rating agencies) ever
really appreciated the full extent of the risk.7 This category of explanations raises questions about the psychology and sociology of risk
perception, to which we shall soon turn, because it assumes that there
was a systematic underestimation of the risk regarding what buyers
and sellers should have rationally perceived at the time.
The second category of explanations is that neither the sell side
nor the buy side was fooled: both appreciated the risk from the subprime debt and the threat to liquidity. Perhaps institutional buyers
perceived that the risk was actually small enough to justify in light of

2
See MARTIN NEIL BAILY ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE ORIGINS OF THE FINANCIAL CRI8–9 (2008), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/
11_origins_crisis_baily_litan/11_origins_crisis_baily_litan.pdf. For an explanation of the
structure of these mortgages and the aggressive sales practices at origination, see Oren BarGill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1073, 1096–1107, 1129–32 (2009).
3
See Whitehead, supra note 1, at 4–6, 25–30.
4
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 211, 241 (2009) (“In the subprime crisis, for example, underwriters customarily purchased some portion of the subordinated ‘equity’ tranches of ABS CDO securities to
demonstrate their belief in the securities being sold.”).
5
Cf. John P. Harding & Stephen L. Ross, Regulation of Large Financial Institutions:
Lessons from Corporate Finance Theory, 16 CONN. INS. L.J. 243, 250 (2009) (“While most large
investment banks and bank holding company subsidiaries that originated subprime mortgages operated with the intent to pool and sell mortgage-backed securities as soon as a
sufficient number of loans had been originated, at any given time, they nevertheless had
significant exposure to subprime loans because they were holding mortgages as inventory
awaiting future sales or holding securities as part of their underwriting and trading
operations.”).
6
See Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 216–36 (discussing how complexity can prompt market failures).
7
See Bar-Gill, supra note 2, at 1081–82 & n.15, 1118–23; see also Schwarcz, supra note
4, at 221–25 (discussing how the complexity of modern investment securities can hinder
disclosure and conceal consequences).
SIS
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the expected returns,8 but mainly, this second category involves stories about agency costs and moral hazards. Implicit government subsidies and regulatory distortions (many of the “too-big-to-fail” sort) plus
insurance in various forms encouraged shifting the risk elsewhere, including to taxpayers.9 Market participants simply exploited those externalities, which is far from irrational.10 Or perhaps buy-side
institutions were the instigators for purely selfish reasons because
compensation arrangements enriched portfolio managers in the near
term based on the above-normal profits that the subprime and related
investments generated, which also shifted the risks to the unsophisticated beneficiaries whose assets they managed.11
The third category of explanations looks to informational asymmetry. This category of explanations claims that the sell side, including the rating agencies, privately understood the excess risk they sold
but concealed it from the buy side.12 This claim is a bit jarring because it assumes that the professional portfolio managers on the buy
side lacked the information and expertise to discover the risk on their
own when that risk was so clear to their counterparties. We know that
some investors bet aggressively on a coming crisis.13 They estimated
8
For a good discussion of the facts available to investors and analysts that might
suggest the foreseeability of the subprime meltdown, see Kristopher Gerardi et al., Making
Sense of the Subprime Crisis, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2008, at 69, 127–42.
On the residual uncertainty that may have made this investment a rational response to
rapid financial innovation while learning evolved by trial and error (with an unfortunate
paucity of error until too late in the game), see Alessio M. Pacces, Uncertainty and the Financial Crisis, 29 J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION 79, 82–87 (2010). This latter view is hard to accept
today given the massive losses those portfolios have suffered, but that difficulty may just be
the hindsight bias at work. Events always seem to have been much more foreseeable at the
time after we know what later came to pass. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological
Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 571–81 (1998).
9
See Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 251–52 & n.232 (discussing moral hazards in institutions deemed too big to fail).
10
See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 106–08, 114–15 (2009) (discussing rational profit-maximizing behavior and the need for government regulation to control the negative externalities of this
behavior); see also Richard A. Posner, Shorting Reason, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 15, 2009, at 30,
31–32 (reviewing AKERLOF & SHILLER, infra note 54, and criticizing the conflation of being
right and being rational in investment decisions).
11
See Charles W. Calomiris, The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s New, and
What’s Next, J. STRUCTURED FIN., Spring 2009, at 6, 12–13.
12
See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2049–50 (2007) (discussing information asymmetry between lenders and investors as to riskiness of subprime loans and potential for
exploitation); Vikas Bajaj & Jenny Anderson, Inquiry Focuses on Withholding of Data on Loans,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, at A1 (discussing New York’s investigation as to “whether Wall
Street banks withheld crucial information about the risks posed by investments linked to
subprime loans” from rating agencies and investors).
13
See Claire A. Hill, Who Were the Villains in the Subprime Crisis, and Why It Matters, 4
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 323, 345 (2010). Some notable examples include John Paulson,
whose involvement in constructing Goldman Sachs’ Abacus deal came under scrutiny in
the suit that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed against the investment
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correctly, so why did so many buyers trust the salespeople? Plenty of
academics and journalists, moreover, warned about the subprime risk
beginning early in the decade.14 The answer might be a rationalagency-cost story similar to the one just given, i.e., that portfolio managers had compensation-based incentives to deliberately ignore the
long-term risk, or the answer might again bring us back to possible
biases in risk perception.
To lawyers especially, these three categories are richly interesting
and important. Understanding what mash-up of explanations was at
work is crucial to the success of any regulatory reform in this area.15
The many lawsuits arising from the financial crisis that both public
enforcers and private plaintiffs are litigating depend on sorting these
explanations out because some of these explanations fit with state of
mind standards like scienter, willfulness, recklessness, gross negligence, and bad faith, but others do not.
This Essay, however, is about neither regulatory reform nor the
flood of pending litigation, though it will look briefly at the highly
publicized lawsuit that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) filed against Goldman Sachs.16 Instead, my interest here is in
the cognitive challenge faced by those who play a “gatekeeper” role in
financial firms and similar business organizations and therefore become involved in the institutional processes of risk perception and
risk management.17 By most accounts, the gatekeepers at many financial firms did a poor job in the events leading up to the crisis.18 I am
especially interested in corporate lawyers, whose task is to help their
publicly-owned or publicly-regulated clients to identify firm-specific
risk with enough accuracy to enable them to satisfy mandatory disclosure responsibilities under federal securities and banking laws. Ongoing risk disclosure at many financial institutions was of low quality,
and their shareholders suffered considerable losses when the undis-

bank, see Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, S.E.C. Accuses Goldman of Fraud in Housing
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2010, at A1, and Jeff Greene, whose profits in betting against the
housing market became a political liability in his failed Senate bid, see Jeff Ostrowski, Feud
Simmers over Greene’s Subprime Bet, PALM BEACH POST, July 11, 2010, at 1A.
14
See POSNER, supra note 10, at 77–78 (arguing that “[t]here were plenty of warnings
of a housing bubble, beginning in 2003; warnings about excessive leverage in financial
firms; and even rather precise predictions of the debacle that has ensued,” which included
papers from economists and news articles).
15
See Hill, supra note 13, at 346–49.
16
See infra Part IV.
17
See JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (2006) (defining gatekeepers).
18
See Robert J. Rhee, The Madoff Scandal, Market Regulatory Failure and the Business Education of Lawyers, 35 J. CORP. L. 363, 365 (2009) (“Among the many leitmotifs of the financial crisis is the failure of lawyers as regulators and gatekeepers.”).
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closed risks came to pass.19 In this sense, there is a strong similarity in
this crisis with the round of financial reporting scandals from earlier
in the decade—Enron, WorldCom, and the like—that provoked Congress to pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002.20 Lawyers are at the
heart of the disclosure risk management that Sarbanes-Oxley demands,21 as are independent directors, especially those on the audit
committee, and the firm’s independent auditors.22 Something did
not work the way it was supposed to, and there is pressure to do much
better.23
My aim in this Essay is to draw a heuristic map to help lawyers,
directors, and auditors navigate the challenges of institutional risk
perception going forward, drawing from what we have learned from
these recent painful experiences. All three of the explanatory categories are crucial to this exercise, but I am going to narrow the focus.
To the extent that there are entirely rational, self-interested explanations for managers’ behavior on the sell side (or on both the sell and
buy sides), these problems are fairly conventional. Auditing, internal
controls, and other monitoring devices have long been designed to try
to prevent or expose intentional, opportunistic breaches of duty.
Monitoring is not easy by any means: there is a serious gap in terms of
what regulators and the public expect from gatekeepers in terms of
fraud prevention and what they can actually do at a reasonable cost. I
make no effort to contribute to the existing body of knowledge and
expertise about monitoring. On the other hand, if psychological or
cultural forces alter or bias risk perception inside firms, then the lawyer’s, director’s, or auditor’s challenge is different. The firm’s managers may well have come to believe in good faith (a cognitively-loaded
legal construct, to be sure) that no risk or problem is big enough to
worry about, while an outside observer in possession of the same information would disagree. As one organizational behaviorist has said,
19
See Deborah R. Meshulam & Grayson D. Stratton, Lessons from the Credit Crisis: Can
Market Participants Bear the Risk?, BUS. L. TODAY 2–4 (Aug. 2, 2010), http://
www.abanet.org/buslaw/blt/content/articles/2010/08/mt0001.pdf (providing examples
of alleged inadequacies in disclosure during the financial crisis and the lawsuits they
engendered).
20
Cf. COFFEE, supra note 17, at 9 (“In response to the epidemic of corporate financial
scandals that broke out in the United States between 2000 and 2003, Congress enacted the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which principally focused on the role and responsibilities of
gatekeepers.”).
21
See id. at 216–23. See generally Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of
Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725 (2004) (providing an overview of duties
imposed on lawyers by Sarbanes-Oxley and relevant rules).
22
See COFFEE, supra note 17, at 17, 25–30, 170–71.
23
Most recently, the SEC revised its corporate governance disclosure rules to require
a description of the board’s role in risk oversight. See Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74
Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,344–45, 68,364–65 (Dec. 23, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.407(h)) (revising item 407 of Reg. S-K).
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“[o]nce you’ve been in the water long enough[,] you no longer perceive you’re in water.”24 This statement is true even when the water
starts getting hot, as long as it happens gradually, as with boiled
frogs.25 For the outside observer, substitute judge, juror, or regulator,
the importance of the gatekeeper’s cognitive role is clear: The gatekeeper’s task is to bring the outsider perspective to work ex ante, as a
risk management device.
The map I sketch here identifies what lawyers, directors, and auditors should look for as gatekeepers when measuring the risk perceptions inside the institution. There is both a legal and an ethical
dimension to this journey. Lawyers, as opposed to managers, must
meet professional expectations—loyalty to the organizational client
and the need to avoid assisting a client’s wrongful course of action—
to which the task relates closely. Here, however, I am more concerned about the client’s own business ethics. Perceived ethical
breaches can do severe reputational damage to a firm even if the
firm’s actions might technically have been lawful. Moreover, ethical
slippage is often the precursor to what later becomes a violation of
law: moral rationalization leads to small levels of opportunism about
which no guilt is felt, leading to sequentially bigger levels of cheating
before the reality of legal wrongdoing becomes clear.26 Compromised
ethicality in both individual managers and larger groups is an institutional risk about which gatekeepers must constantly worry.
The gauntlet I throw down here is directed at those gatekeepers
who are inclined—indeed motivated—to infer that nothing is amiss so
long as the people they meet and the behaviors they observe show
none of the visible markings of disloyalty: extreme selfishness, sloth,
dishonesty, etc. Once gatekeepers find markers of hard work, intensity, optimism, and enthusiasm by people inside the organization who
seem dedicated and sincere, they relax their guard. More than anything, what I want to show here is how hard work, intensity, optimism,
and enthusiasm can sometimes be the source of the trouble.

24
Dennis K. Berman, Tourre: A Hero in Villain’s Garb?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2010, at C1
(quoting Professor Adam Galinsky of Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of
Business).
25
Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1105
(2003) (“If a frog is dropped into hot water, it supposedly jumps out. But if a frog is put
into cold water that is then heated, the frog doesn’t notice the gradual temperature
change, and eventually dies. . . . The frog doesn’t notice the [temperature] increase because of a sensory failure; it senses not absolute temperature but changes in
temperature.”).
26
See John M. Darley, The Cognitive and Social Psychology of Contagious Organizational
Corruption, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1179–85 (2005).
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I
SKETCHING OUT

THE

COGNITIVE MAP

A. The Centrality of Corporate Culture
Like law, organizational behavior is a field in which the main disciplines of the social sciences—particularly economics, psychology,
and sociology—do battle. Economics assumes that firms and their
managers act as if they are rational, while the other two disciplines
raise serious doubts about this assumption.27 Sociology and its sibling,
cultural anthropology, question the methodological individualism
found in much of economics and psychology.28 Many sociologists also
doubt the extreme functionalism that is central to economic theory,
including its behavioral branch.29 Like most battles that turn into
prolonged sieges, a large amount of intellectual intermarrying has occurred among those frustrated by the stand-offs among the purists;
hence behavioral economics, rational choice-based sociology, social
and economic psychology, and other interdisciplinary genres have
emerged.30 Legal academics have become adept in the last two decades at picking from all of these when analyzing the behavior of business firms.
No single cognitive map will ever satisfy all of these disciplines, so
some simplifying methodological assumptions are necessary. I have
already pushed rational choice aside not because it is wrong or unimportant—lawyers and other gatekeepers surely must understand the
economic incentive structure embedded in any firm with which they
27
See Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1500–02 (1998).
28
See generally LARS UDEHN, METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM: BACKGROUND, HISTORY
AND MEANING 1–6 (2001) (reviewing the debate over methodological individualism). Psychologists may disagree, of course. For commentary, see, for example, Martin Kilduff &
David Krackhardt, Bringing the Individual Back In: Structural Analysis of the Internal Market for
Reputation in Organizations, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 87, 87–88, 105–06 (1994) (summarizing
structuralism’s rejection of individualism, arguing for the integration of “psychology and
the role of individuals . . . [into] social network analysis,” and “challeng[ing] the claimed
incommensurability of individualism and structuralism by pointing to the influence on
structural analysis of the psychology it has purported to reject”); Barry M. Staw & Robert I.
Sutton, Macro Organizational Psychology, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: ADVANCES
IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 350, 352–67 (J. Keith Murnighan ed., 1993) (reviewing individualist and collectivist perspectives of psychology and sociology, respectively, and providing a
rationale for macro-organizational psychology, which employs psychology to explain organizational behavior).
29
See Geoffrey Ingham, Some Recent Changes in the Relationship Between Economics and
Sociology, 20 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 243, 251–52 (1996) (“[T]here is widespread agreement
amongst sociologists that functionalism of the most flawed kind pervades a great deal of
economic analysis . . . .”).
30
For an extensive analysis of the application of behavioral economics and the firm,
see Colin F. Camerer & Ulrike Malmendier, Behavioral Economics of Organizations, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 235, at 235–73 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007).
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are dealing—but because this particular map is meant for travel
outside that realm. Next, we come to the matter of individual versus
culture and psychology versus sociology and anthropology. Here,
purely for heuristic purposes, I take functionalism—in familiar evolutionary terms—as my starting point. I do this with one further narrowing in mind: I designed my map for firms in highly competitive
markets. The functional task is to coordinate the activities of perhaps
thousands of agents in pursuit of competitive success externally, while
recognizing that agents’ individual self-interest may be antagonistic to
the common good. Conventional economics explores many possible
ways of mediating this problem—external monitoring, incentive contracts, and the like—none of which offers anywhere near perfect solutions.31 A strong corporate culture, however, can help considerably.
George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton have argued, for instance, that
instilling a strong sense of bonded identity with others in the group, as
the United States Marines do, can reduce agency cost frictions and
make self-interested defection less likely.32 A strong in-group versus
out-group cultural orientation can also encourage the maintenance of
a highly aggressive, opportunistic stance toward outsiders, such as customers and competitors, while softening in-group competition—an attitude that, right or not, is fairly commonplace in hypercompetitive
industries like retail, financial services, and computer technology.33
My heuristic postulates that organizations that have had sustained
marketplace success will have highly adaptive, functional cultures. I
accept that as we dig deeper into the human dimension of any organization, as ethnographers do, we will find practices, routines, and beliefs that are unique to each institution’s history and situation, many
of which seem far from functional. All organizations have myths, ceremonies, totems, fetishes, and the like: they are profoundly human institutions, not abstractions.34 My hunch, however, is that competitive
pressures temper these considerably. This bow to the conventional
economic lesson that incentives matter suggests that in digging into

31

See, e.g., PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGE(1992) 185–88 (analyzing monitoring and incentive contracts as solutions for controlling moral hazards in the field of organizational economics).
32
See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Identity and the Economics of Organizations, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 9, 9–16, 27–29 (2005).
33
See Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black Box of “Corporate Culture” in Law and
Economics, 162 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 80, 86 (2006). For a thoughtful
exploration of cultural effects on lawyers’ decision making, see generally Milton C. Regan,
Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941 (2007).
34
For a classic exposition, see John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 343–48 (1977).
MENT
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the competitively successful organization as a social institution, we begin by looking for competitively adaptive aspects to its culture.35
I do not mean to suggest that individuals are not important.
Power matters in organizations, individuals, and small groups. In particular, the CEO and the board have a substantial degree of agency to
make important decisions. They have their own private information,
dispositions, and situations. Here again, however, we can try to bridge
the gap by presuming that competition (both external and internal)
pressures individuals and that individual judgment and decision making should also adapt for them to succeed. To me, there are more
similarities than differences in how that adaptation is likely to play out
inside firms and inside managers’ minds.
B. Adaptive Cultures
The idea that corporate cultures affect business, legal, and ethical
judgment is old news; we can take that much as given. Rarely, though,
does the legal literature attempt to theorize about how or why cultures
evolve and persist. Instead, the literature presumes that cultures are
sorted easily into the healthy and the unhealthy so that the law can
simply punish the bad and reward the good. My argument here is
that cultural influences on risk taking—the good and the bad—can
best be understood by considering their functionality, focusing on
value added in terms of coordination, motivation, or both. What we
look for, in other words, are ways that cultures have of facilitating the
efficient coordination among agents of the firm by promoting common beliefs, perceptions, and inferences about the prevailing situation and legitimate ways of responding to it.
I have written at some length elsewhere about the efficiency of
corporate cultures,36 as have others in the organizational behavior
and economics literature,37 and will not repeat my claim in detail because I want to move on quickly to new material connected to the
35
For an illuminating study of the psychology and culture of risk taking by traders at
London investment banks that is sensitive to these competitive constraints, see MARK FENTON-O’CREEVY ET AL., TRADERS: RISKS, DECISIONS, AND MANAGEMENT IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
74–145 (2005).
36
See Langevoort, supra note 33, at 83–94.
37
On the economics of corporate culture from a variety of perspectives, see, for example, Benjamin E. Hermalin, Economics and Corporate Culture, in The INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND CLIMATE 217, 218–42 (Cary L. Cooper et al.
eds., 2001) (summarizing and assessing economists’ previous studies and writings on corporate culture); Eric Van den Steen, On the Origin of Shared Beliefs (and Corporate Culture), 41
RAND J. ECON. 617, 619–21, 638–40 (2010) (reviewing economics literature on corporate
culture and conceiving of corporate culture as shared values and beliefs). See generally
David M. Kreps, Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 90–141 (James E. Alt & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990) (exploring corporate culture from the perspective of economic theory). Krebs’s model is discussed at
length in Hermalin, supra, at 218–30.
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financial crisis. My basic point is simple enough and draws from evolutionary theory. Firms that generate an adaptive culture (deliberately or otherwise) are more likely to thrive and survive competitive
marketplace stresses than those that do not.38 We should concede to
the sociologists that over time even the most adaptive cultures eventually tend to weaken and gradually transform to ones dominated by
narrowed focus, routines, myths, and ceremonies until they die out
completely as unfit for competitive survival.39 But, for the time when
they have found a high level of adaptive competitive fitness, they are
profoundly powerful in the economy and the capital markets. Think
Google, Apple, Goldman Sachs, or—sadly—Enron and Countrywide.
What is the likely content of an adaptive corporate culture?
Again, at a high level of generality, the point is simple. The set of
external stimuli facing a firm’s agents is constantly changing, uncertain, and complex, and if hundreds or thousands of agents disagree
and have to negotiate a shared interpretation, the firm will collapse
due to indecision, disunity, worry, and paralysis. To preserve the capacity for action and motivation, this sense making must be simplified
into a coherent interpretive script.40 Here, we see the departure from
conventional Bayesean rationality.41 If ambiguity and uncertainty
threaten internal coherence and coordination, the ambiguity and uncertainty have to be edited down, if not out. This is especially so when
the firm is in a highly-competitive setting in which work is completed
at a high velocity, the risk of failure is considerable, and the profits
from success immense. In other work, I have used the term “grease”
to describe cultural beliefs that facilitate competitive drive.42 Wellgreased cultures deflect doubt and uncertainty, and they enable the
focus and intensity necessary to sustain high-velocity effort. The key
point is that well-greased cultures will often substitute warmly adaptive
38
See Daniel Denison, Organizational Culture: Can It Be a Key Lever for Driving Organizational Change?, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND CLIMATE, supra note 37, at 347, 356 (“Organizations that are strong in adaptability usually
experience sales growth and increased market share.”).
39
See Richard R. Nelson, Recent Evolutionary Theorizing About Economic Change, 33 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 48, 78–79 (1995) (discussing some sociologists’ organizational ecology
models and noting that “the set of things a firm can do well at any time is quite limited,”
and despite their ability to “learn to do new things, these learning capabilities also are
limited”); cf. Bo Hedberg & Christian Maravelias, Organizational Culture and Imaginary Organizations, in THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE & CLIMATE, supra
note 37, at 587, 594 (noting that “[a] distinct and strong culture” in an organization
“might improve its capability to handle specific environmental circumstances” but may
hamper that organization’s “capabilities to adapt to changing environments”).
40
See Langevoort, supra note 33, at 83–86.
41
See id. at 85–86 (“[I]n the face of extensive ambiguity and uncertainty, corporate
cultures are free to evolve in the direction of productive sense-making rather than
Bayesean accuracy.”).
42
Id. at 85.
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beliefs for coldly realistic ones.43 Competitive success then reinforces
those perceptions and inferences, gradually turning them into temporarily useful, sustaining myths.
This sort of idea has substantial intellectual support within nowmainstream (if not orthodox) economics, in a body of theoretical and
empirical literature on overconfidence in individuals, which links directly to the financial crisis.44 Psychological research shows that moderate—as opposed to severely unrealistic—overconfidence has a
number of payoffs, including inducing greater persistence, effort, and
risk taking than otherwise.45 The risk taking is crucial—those that
take greater risks and have good luck will outperform those who are
realistically more cautious.46 A streak of good luck can put substantial
competitive distance between the risk takers and the realists. And
without getting too far ahead of ourselves, the fact of risk-taking success, even if largely good fortune rather than skill, can become a selffulfilling prophecy as the success enables the gathering of resources
(e.g., capital, support of allies) that creates a real competitive advantage in successive rounds. Well-known economists who have explored
this area apply it both at the level of executives competing in the internal promotion tournament and at the level of the firm competing
with others in its product markets.47
An overly optimistic or confident internal corporate culture
should have precisely the same effect. It is easy to see how the common perceptions that mildly excessive optimism and confidence gen43

See id. at 85–86.
For such an argument, see Malcolm Gladwell, Cocksure: Banks, Battles, and the Psychology of Overconfidence, NEW YORKER, July 27, 2009, at 24, 26–28.
45
See, e.g., id. at 27 (discussing social scientists’ view of overconfidence as “an adaptive
trait”); Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological
Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 193, 199 (1988) (“[R]esearch evidence
indicates that self-enhancement, exaggerated beliefs in control, and unrealistic optimism
can be associated with higher motivation, greater persistence, more effective performance,
and ultimately, greater success.”).
46
See Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent
Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93
GEO. L.J. 285, 299–300 (2004).
47
See, e.g., Simon Gervais & Itay Goldstein, The Positive Effects of Biased Self-Perceptions in
Firms, 11 REV. FIN. 453, 479–81 (2007) (concluding that worker overconfidence encourages
harder work, reduces free-riding, and ultimately increases firm productivity); Anand M.
Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate Governance, 63 J. FIN.
2737, 2737–41, 2769–72 (2008) (discussing the effects of managerial overconfidence on
internal promotion and CEO overconfidence on firm value); cf. Eric Van den Steen, Rational Overoptimism (and Other Biases), 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1141, 1141–43 (2004) (discussing
the “‘choice-driven overoptimism’ mechanism” that results in an agent’s positive bias
“about the consequences of his own actions, relative to others”). For empirical evidence of
overconfidence, see, for example, Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, CEO Overconfidence
and Corporate Investment, 60 J. FIN. 2661, 2667–79 (2005) (constructing “three measures of
overconfidence . . . based on the personal portfolio decisions of CEOs” and providing
evidence of such behaviors).
44

1220

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1209

erate are organizationally adaptive. They reduce worry and anxiety,
which facilitates focused work. They prompt thoughts of a bountiful
future, a larger pie to share, which facilitates intrafirm trust and cooperation, while a depressed culture does just the opposite: it frames the
situation as a last-period risk that generates selfishness and defection.48 Thus, integrative solutions to the endless negotiations that
make up the day-to-day work inside the firm are easier to find.
And that, of course, is also the problem.49 If those deeply enmeshed in this culture are responsible, say, for accurately disclosing
the level of risk that the firm faces, they will often get it wrong—albeit
often in good faith—because they are too optimistic. Lawyers or independent directors who are naively willing to accept overly-confident
risk assessments from insiders simply because they have greater firmspecific knowledge, without adjusting for the risk of perceptual bias,
will produce inaccurate, unrealistic disclosures. A recent, well-publicized paper by Catherine Schrand and Sarah Zechman offers both
theory and empirical evidence that traces the slippery slope to financial misreporting that executive overconfidence sets in motion.50
Cultural overoptimism is just one example of adaptive bias. My
broader argument is that any belief system will be similarly adaptive if
it simplifies, reduces distractions, and facilitates focus on the work at
hand. Here, we see the connection to the large body of common
heuristics and biases at the individual level that psychologists have
identified. Gerd Gigerenzer and others argue that many of these belief systems are evolutionarily adaptive precisely because they promote
quick (and usually functional) judgments rather than force the brain
to exert the effort through a more elaborate analysis.51 To be sure,
the brain evolved these heuristics thousands of years ago, and they are
hardwired within us,52 whereas cultural adaptation works completely
48
See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 154–56
(1997).
49
The term “groupthink” often refers to the downside of narrowed focus and intensity. For both an exposition and review, see generally Roland Bénabou, Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets 1–27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14764, 2009) (examining how groupthink arises and continues in
organizations).
50
See Catherine M. Schrand & Sarah L.C. Zechman, Executive Overconfidence and
the Slippery Slope to Fraud 9–35, (Sept. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265631. I developed a similar argument in Langevoort, supra
note 48, at 121–26, 135–41. See also Langevoort, supra note 46, at 307–08 (positing that as
the threat to incumbency grows, overconfident CEOs will embark on a slippery slope of
obfuscation, concealment, and greater risk taking to retain office).
51
See GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 14–24, 30–31
(1999).
52
See id. at 57 (noting that recognition heuristic employs “a capacity that evolution
has shaped over millions of years”).
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differently. But the analogy can still be useful. The basic idea is that
whatever cognitive simplification is adaptive within a single brain, far
more is necessary to coordinate the perceptions and inferences of
multiple actors within a large firm.
II
INSTITUTIONAL RISK PERCEPTION
Institutional judgment and decision making take many different
forms, making it hard to generalize about risk perception. Individuals
(the CEO or CFO, for instance) or small groups (boards of directors)
clearly make some key decisions, but even these decisions are made in
a highly social setting, based on information gathered, processed, and
refined through institutional channels. In addition, much that is important in risk perception is what is not noticed or taken into account.
Though we can tie failures to notice to individual or small-group judgment—that is what plaintiffs do when bringing bad faith claims
against officers and directors53—this is a domain that seems especially
social and cultural, as I argued in Part I.
My argument is that we can plausibly project individual cognitive
biases onto the larger organizational culture to the extent that they
serve either a simplifying or motivating function that greases the
firm’s competitive machinery. Thus, in analyzing the recent financial
crisis, it makes sense to consider the kinds of individual heuristics and
biases that might lead to a systematic underestimation of risk, even
though the risk might be objectively significant. Fortunately, others
have taken up this task with respect to the kinds of risks that led to the
crisis, and we do not need to repeat what they have said except for a
brief summary.54
Like most bubbles, housing prices, and the value of the securitizations and derivatives tied to them, rose over the course of an extended
period of time under circumstances that seemed unprecedented historically and could be explained (the “this-time-it’s-different” phe53
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006); In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 969–70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
54
This is an important theme in a number of books, perhaps the best known of which
is GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM (2009) 5–7, 11–56,
86–96, 169–71. See also, e.g., Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance and Financial Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 23, 34–45
(2009) (discussing the behavioral factors and failures of risk control linked to the causes of
the financial crisis); Hersh Shefrin, How Psychological Pitfalls Generated the Global Financial
Crisis, in INSIGHTS INTO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 224, 224–32, 250–54 (Laurence B.
Siegel ed., 2009) (positing that “specific psychological reactions,” such as overconfidence
and risk-seeking, to external economic factors “took the global financial system to the
brink of collapse,” instead of those economic factors themselves).
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nomenon)55 by reference to shifts in the technology of finance that
allowed for a much more efficient diffusion and dispersion of realestate-related risk. What appeared to be a continuous trend could
therefore be extrapolated forward without much pause, especially
when authoritative figures like Alan Greenspan at the Federal Reserve
offered justifications for the perception, and other major institutions
showed no signs of hesitation.56 Financial firms used risk-modeling
technology that institutionalized this trend, demanding data as inputs
to complex mathematical algorithms where the only available data was
from the recent run-up.57 And we can add the obvious: the mind’s
tendency to justify that which is profitable—motivated inference—
which no doubt caused some people in these firms to ignore facts they
did not want to confront.
I agree that all of these biases, which Geoff Miller and Gerald
Rosenfeld call “intellectual hazards,”58 played a causal role in judgment and decision making on both the sell and buy sides. They fit
readily into my account of cultural perceptions that simplify and motivate, but there is a predictable objection to excessively psychologicallybased accounts of the crisis to which we must first attend.59 After all,
senior executives are presumably selected for their strong cognitive
ability and managerial skills; if so, that presumably should weed out
those prone to bias. This kind of assumption has led many, like Richard Posner, to infer that financial firms simply took calculated risks
(admittedly in the face of great informational ambiguity) given the
attractive rates of return, with distortions from the optimal being the

55
See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 207–15 (2009).
56
See id. at 208–10; see also Posner, supra note 10, at 31 (“Since very few economists
and no government officials warned of a bubble, it was not irrational for people to think
that houses were a good investment, even though house prices had risen steeply since the
1990s.”).
57
See Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 24,
46 (“VaR [Value at Risk model] didn’t see the risk [of AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities] because it generally relied on a two-year data history.”); see also Gerardi et al., supra
note 8, at 133–34 (discussing deficiencies of subprime loan performance data that hindered risk modeling).
58
See Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases
in Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807, 818
(2010); see also id. at 808 (defining intellectual hazard as “the tendency of behavioral biases
to interfere with accurate thought and analysis within complex organizations”); sources
cited supra note 54.
59
Cf. POSNER, supra note 10, at xiv, 100, 112 (declining to list “psychological factors
among the underlying causes of the depression” and arguing that “[t]here is no need to
bring cognitive quirks, emotional forces, or character flaws into the causal analysis”); see
also Posner, supra note 10, at 30, 32–33 (disagreeing with the notion of behavioral economics that irrational behavior is a cause of economic depressions).
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result of conventional agency cost and moral hazard problems, not
bias.60
This alternative account cannot easily be ruled out; I will leave to
others the question of exactly how well the conventional explanation
fits the observed data. At the very least, we should try to drill deeper
to ground the case for caring about psychology and culture as causal
forces in suboptimal decision making in highly competitive firms.
Part I of this Essay gave one kind of justification that responds directly
to Posner’s assumption. CEOs and other senior executives may be
chosen precisely because they exhibit certain traits—overconfidence
being the most obvious—that are adaptive in terms of generating cohesion and motivation even though they generate certain predictable
costs as a result of the bias. Alternatively, we could say that overconfident CEOs are the natural product of promotion tournaments monitored by people who lack the information, incentive, or both to make
more finely-textured choices.61 This promotional process is exceedingly important when the economy has been on a long winning streak;
good luck will be bountiful and promotions will disproportionately go
to the lucky risk takers. Thus, a critical mass of the overconfident may
come to dominate the organization and its culture.
Even if we assume that CEOs will display a higher level of cognitive skill and prudence, their information sources are diffused broadly
within the organization, making them dependent on institutional risk
perception. Where risk is deeply embedded in a portfolio of
unimaginable complexity, as in the case of securitizations and derivatives, that dependency can be both considerable and disabling. Finally, even if we put aside all these points, a psychological account
could join up with the conventional agency cost analysis and emphasize motivated inference: CEOs have compensation and career incentives to perceive the situation in a near-term time frame and dismiss
risks that could be rationalized away. Of course, revealed preferences
are all that matters to conventional economic analysis, but again, it is
not all that matters to legal analysis, where state of mind is almost
always of determinative importance. State of mind is, necessarily, a
psychological inquiry.
60
See POSNER, supra note 10, at 75–116 (attributing causes of the financial crisis to
“rational self-interested decision-making” of managers, consumers, and financial institutions, which imposed negative externalities on the economy as a whole); see also id. at
284–85 (arguing that “[c]apitalism is Darwinian” and that it is unrealistic to expect market
participants to control their rational self-interested behavior because of the possibility that
such actions in the aggregate may trigger an economic crisis).
61
See Goel & Thakor, supra note 47, at 2771 (concluding that, because of the corporate promotion process, which favors promotion of overconfident managers, a corporate
board is “likely to end up with a pool of overconfident managers from which to choose a
CEO”); see also Langevoort, supra note 46, at 292–95 (discussing constraints on the board’s
ability to effectively monitor management).
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CHUCK PRINCE

A year or so before the crisis hit, the Financial Times quoted Citigroup’s CEO, Chuck Prince, as saying that he understood that
“[w]hen the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and
dance. We’re still dancing.”62 Countless books, articles, blogs, and the
like repeat this reference to the children’s game of musical chairs,63
not only because it hints at some contemporaneous awareness of a
looming risk, but because it is so eerily evocative. Without for a moment suggesting that I know precisely what he meant, which may in
fact have had little or nothing to do with subprime risk,64 I think we
can dig deeper into organizational psychology and culture by considering three ways in which his dancing reference might be read.
A. Feeling the Music
Dancing evokes a form of emotional expression, not usually a logical one. One of the problems with the arid reference to heuristics
and biases in much of the legal literature is that it fails to capture the
emotional aspect of judgment and decision making as it relates to risk.
In fact, in a growing body of work on cognitive neuroscience, researchers have come to better understand the strong role of emotions
in financial risk taking. Among many things, this work suggests that
different portions of the brain are activated when emotions such as
fear and greed are prompted, moving the locus of decision away from
the rational processing of information that is centered in the
prefrontal cortex.65 Without trying to review this emerging field, interesting inferences can be drawn that connect closely to the financial
crisis. Consider the following Congressional testimony offered by Andrew Lo, an economics professor at MIT and a hedge fund adviser:
62
Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Bullish Citigroup is ‘Still Dancing’ to the Beat of
the Buy-Out Boom, FIN. TIMES (London), July 10, 2007, at 1-1.
63
See POSNER, supra note 10, at 88–89; GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD
DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P. MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 148 (2009); Dealbook, Citi Chief on Buyouts: ‘We’re Still Dancing,’
NYTIMES.COM (July 10, 2007, 10:54 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/citichief-on-buyout-loans-were-still-dancing; Steven Pearlstein, The Art of Managing Risk, WASH.
POST, Nov. 28, 2007, at D1.
64
In testimony before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Prince explained that
the reference was to the “leveraged lending business” of private equity financing and had
nothing to do with subprime. See Cyrus Sanati, Prince Finally Explains His Dancing Comment,
NYTIMES.COM (Apr. 8, 2010, 2:04 PM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/08/
prince-finally-explains-his-dancing-comment.
65
See Peter Bossaerts, What Decision Neuroscience Teaches Us About Financial Decision Making, 1 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 383, 394–95 (2009).
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During extended periods of prosperity, market participants become
complacent about the risk of loss—either through systematic underestimation of those risks because of recent history, or a decline in
their risk aversion due to increasing wealth, or both. In fact, there
is mounting evidence from cognitive neuroscientists that financial
gain affects the same “pleasure centers” of the brain that are activated by certain narcotics. This suggests that prolonged periods of
economic growth and prosperity can induce a collective sense of
euphoria and complacency among investors that is not unlike the
drug-induced stupor of a cocaine addict. Moreover, the financial
liberalization that typically accompanies this prosperity implies
greater availability of risk capital, greater competition for new
sources of excess expected returns, more highly correlated risk-taking behavior because of the “crowded trade” phenomenon, and a
false sense of security derived from peers who engage in the same
behavior and with apparent success.66

Unpacking this paragraph is difficult, but it offers an intuition of
considerable interest. Within financial firms, individuals may become
more aggressive in their risk taking in response to positive feedback
and other forms of anticipation that light up the nucleus accumbens.67 Of course, their fear and revulsion create the opposite effect:
the amygdala, located within the temples, acts as the brain’s emotional center to trigger panic responses.68 But during a prolonged
bubble, there may be a gradual domination of emotional justification
for risky activity, protected from any opportunity to learn from hard
experience: the visceral excitement of the dance that makes it hard to
slow down, much less stop.
The last sentence in Lo’s claim brings us to another aspect of
dancing to which the emotions relate: its social dimension. The positive feedback that generates increasing levels of excitement and di66
Andrew W. Lo, Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008,
Written Testimony Prepared for the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Hearing on Hedge Funds 12–13 (Nov. 13, 2008) (internal
footnote omitted), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1301217. For some of Lo’s work in financial neuroscience, see Andrew W. Lo & Dmitry V.
Repin, The Psychophysiology of Real-Time Financial Risk Processing, 14 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 323, 332–33 (2002) (studying physiological responses of professional securities traders and finding “that emotional responses are a significant factor in the real-time
processing of financial risks”). For a more general discussion relating to the financial crisis, see Gary Stix, The Science of Bubbles and Busts, SCI. AM., July 2009, at 78, 80–85.
67
See William J. Bernstein, Of Laws, Lending, and Limbic Systems, 66 FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Jan.–Feb. 2010, at 17, 19 (noting that the nucleus accumbens “respond[s] most intensely
to the anticipation of reward” and labeling it the “greed center”).
68
See id. (noting that the amygdala “activate[s] in reaction to revulsion, fear, and
financial loss,” labeling it “the financial market’s horsemen of the apocalypse”). While fear
reduces the tendency toward risk-taking, anger does the opposite. See Jennifer S. Lerner &
Dacher Keltner, Fear, Anger, and Risk, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 146, 146–47,
154–56 (2001).
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minished risk perception can be personal success or the observed
success of others.69 This success suggests a connection to adaptive
corporate cultures, particularly their motivational function. A contagion of enthusiasm energizes those segments of the organization responsible for the creation and marketing (or purchase) of complex
financial products, enabling the extraordinarily hard work that goes
into the high-velocity deal flow.70 This is high-grade corporate grease.
It is likely to energize, if not enthuse, even the support staff in the
back office—far from the trading desks and sales calls—because of the
feeling of purpose and profitable future. Moreover, those central to
the excitement, who easily achieve the “high” that Lo refers to, will be
favored in the corporate promotion tournament.71 They quickly take
on more seniority and power, in turn silencing expressions of risk
from people who might want to turn down the music. Maybe that is
why the dancing Chuck Prince described was so frenzied for so long.
This emotional and social account meshes fairly well with what we
observe inside highly competitive financial firms. There is a strong
emotional emphasis on team building and bonding—fraternity-like
excesses included. “Wins” by one person or team are celebrated visibly, with ample loathing for the losers, which sends multiple loaded
messages to their colleagues (who are also their internal competitors).
Of particular interest along these lines is an ethnographic study of
Wall Street investment bankers by Karen Ho.72 She describes two key
cultural tropes: an obsession with the notion of “the market” as a way
of justifying whatever financial services will sell at the moment and an
obsession with the near-term as the only way to achieve synchronicity
with the market.73 There is a fatalistic element to this because, even
in good times, the market shifts rapidly, and layoffs of bankers are
69
Cf. AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 54, at 55–56 (“Confidence is not just the emotional state of an individual. It is a view of other people’s confidence, and of other people’s perceptions of other people’s confidence. . . . Just as diseases spread through
contagion, so does confidence . . . .”).
70
Cf. Langevoort, supra note 48, at 153–55 (discussing the proliferation and motivational effect of confidence within firms).
71
See Goel & Thakor, supra note 47, at 2745–50; see also Langevoort, supra note 46, at
288 (arguing that “traits such as overoptimism, an inflated sense of self-efficacy and a deep
capacity for ethical self-deception are favored in corporate promotion tournaments, so that
people who possess them are disproportionately represented in executive suites”) (emphasis omitted); cf. Lo & Repin, supra note 66, at 332 (“The extraordinary degree of competitiveness of global financial markets and the outsize rewards that accrue to the ‘fittest’
traders suggest that Darwinian selection—financial selection, to be specific—is at work in
determining the typical profile of the successful trader. After all, unsuccessful traders are
generally ‘eliminated’ from the population after suffering a certain level of losses.”).
72
Karen Ho, Disciplining Investment Bankers, Disciplining the Economy: Wall Street’s Institutional Culture of Crisis and the Downsizing of “Corporate America,” 111 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST
177 (2009). For a more extended discussion, see generally KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN
ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET (2009).
73
See HO, supra note 72, at 10–11, 242–43; Ho, supra note 72, at 178–80, 184–87.
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common when their expertise goes out of style. Hence, as a matter of
psychological defense if nothing else, the professional culture stresses
acting in the moment.74 She writes:
[T]he rampant job insecurity in investment banks, the fetishization
of hard work that fosters an internalized sense of hyperefficiency
and extreme responsiveness to the demands of the market, an emphasis on instant action and performance that is bolstered by banks’
approaches to compensation not only truncate and tighten bankers’
temporal registers but also demand a total “real-time” identification
with financial markets.75

What we see here is the grease: routines and rationalizations that
support a high-velocity deal-making machine. The coating of grease
deflects disabling reflection on the particular risk hidden within all
the complexity, especially if the risk will play out more than a brief
time into the future, even while there is an inchoate, ever-present
foreboding that the good times never last. I will have more to say
about these rationalizations shortly.
How does this play out on the ground? What it suggests is that
profitable deal flow takes on a dance-like momentum that is very hard
to stop, in part because of the emotional and financial attachment so
many powerful people have to it. In a very prescient set of commentaries published well before the financial crisis hit, Rick Bookstaber, a
former senior risk manager at Salomon Brothers and Morgan Stanley,
warned of the coming debacle and, at one point, described a hypothetical negotiation between a trader and an in-house risk manager
who wanted to slow down the aggressive activity.76 Presumably, after
responding with the usual bluster, the trader might insist that the risk
manager explain exactly what the level of risk is in the particular deal
that would justify foregoing the attractive fees and returns.77 In a setting of high uncertainty and complexity, this is impossible to answer
persuasively, especially by an overworked, underresourced (and often
inexpert) risk manager.78 Absent the ability to give a precisely quanti74

See Ho, supra note 72, at 186–87.
Id. at 179.
76
See Rick Bookstaber, Conversations with the Trading Desk, RICKBOOKSTABER.COM (Dec.
2, 2007), http://rick.bookstaber.com/2007/12/conversations-with-trading-desk.html.
Bookstaber, now an SEC official, elaborated on this and the market becoming more vulnerable to crisis before the meltdown. See RICK BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 5–6, 255–60
(2007).
77
Lo described a similar hypothetical to Congress, noting that during the boom, a
Chief Risk Officer’s recommendation to reduce collateralized debt obligation (CDO) activity because of a potential downturn in the real estate market would decrease profits and
prompt an exodus of traders, rendering such a reduction “difficult to justify.” Lo, supra
note 66, at 13–14.
78
See Bookstaber, supra note 76 (noting that “the risk manager is always at a disadvantage when dealing with the trading desk” in part because the traders have greater expertise
75
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fied answer, it is a matter of judgment and therefore politics, a negotiation the risk manager will not win. Here, the well-known technology
failure comes into play because the elaborate risk models these firms
built, the so-called VaR models, were compromised by historic data of
very recent vintage that was insufficiently representative of future
risk.79 In the background is a question that is always lurking: if there
is too much risk today, what about yesterday, when things were hardly
any different and yet no objections were raised? This, of course, is the
basis for a common bias that, I suspect, often affects organizations
fairly severely: cognitive conservatism. When change happens slowly,
it is perceived poorly80 for reasons that are related to the well-known
psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance and the so-called
sunk cost fallacy.81 A voluntary commitment to a course of action
prompts the perception that it was a reasonable course of action,
which motivates resistance to disconfirming information even as
things change.82 Any prior period of time when the organization did
not limit risk taking is open to criticism (and even potential liability)
in hindsight once the risk is acknowledged. This means that even risk
managers may be motivated not to notice the change. They may also
get emotionally caught up in the dancing, at least as spectators.
B. Dance Competition
If Chuck Prince’s quote is read as referring to the children’s
game of musical chairs, then it evokes another possible reading—that
the dancing was impossible to slow down because Citigroup was in
competition with others, each with their eyes on a diminishing numof their own markets and risk managers are generally “too busy to really focus on risk
management”).
79
See supra note 57 and accompanying text. See also Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and
Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial
Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 139–43, 170–74 (2009). See also Kimberly D. Krawiec, The
Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 151–52 (2009) (discussing data deficiencies in
operational risk models).
80
See Sara Kiesler & Lee Sproull, Managerial Response to Changing Environments: Perspectives on Problem Sensing from Social Cognition, 27 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 548, 564 (1982); cf. Volokh,
supra note 25 (describing the boiling frog and its inability to detect gradual temperature
changes).
81
The sunk-cost fallacy refers to the economic behavior of tending “to continue an
endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made.” Hal R. Arkes &
Peter Ayton, The Sunk Cost and Concorde Effects: Are Humans Less Rational Than Lower Animals?, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 591, 591 (1999).
82
See Kiesler & Sproull, supra note 80, 558–59 (asserting that “decision makers’ commitments are to programs, policies, and procedures first, and to data second” and hypothesizing that the more invested managers are in particular scenarios, the more likely they are
to discount detrimental information); cf. id. at 564 (noting that the “corporate penchant
for elaborate forecasting and planning activities discourages the development of schemas
for extreme change. . . . [and] increases the likelihood that, for motivational reasons, stimuli substantially inconsistent with the forecast or plan will be ignored”).
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ber of chairs. This reading raises the issue of how the nature of organizational or individual judgment and decision making shifts as a
result of competition in ways beyond the self-evident effects on the
payoff structure of the game. Given my focus on firms in hypercompetitive industries, this inquiry is particularly important. We already
have some ideas on which to build. As sports coaches stress, competition demands especially high levels of focus and intensity; thus, distractions are dangerous. Intuitively, the more intense the
competition, the more essential the grease.83
We have interesting evidence from recent research on the psychological and physiological effects of competition. A common laboratory finding regarding auctions is that they can trigger a desire to
win that carries over even if success is more costly than not winning—
the tendency to overpay,84 which is one explanation for why mergers
and acquisitions are often value destroying. The “competitive
arousal” model of decision making suggests that situational factors
such as rivalry, heavy time pressures, and the presence of an audience
prepared to judge the competition stimulates physiological and psychological arousal that pushes motivation away from simple goal attainment to an obsession with winning and crowding out more
thoughtful consideration of risks and costs.85 Another study indicates
that the intensity of competitive effects strengthens as the participants
are highly ranked or close to an identifiable standard of comparison.86 Note how deeply all these situational conditions—especially
83
Karen Ho’s description of the felt need at all times for bankers to be synchronized
with the market attests to this: “The quickness of investment banks’ reaction to market
trends signifies their absolute identity with the market; their cultural distinction is the ability to channel the market immediately.” Ho, supra note 72, at 186.
84
See, e.g., Gillian Ku et al., Towards a Competitive Arousal Model of Decision-Making: A
Study of Auction Fever in Live and Internet Auctions, 96 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 89, 99–100 (2005) (finding in laboratory auction experiment that “[r]ivalry
and sunk costs increased the likelihood of overbidding”); Deepak Malhotra, The Desire to
Win: The Effects of Competitive Arousal on Motivation and Behavior, 111 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 139, 139 (2010) (discussing studies showing that “the
desire to beat rival bidders can lead auction participants to pay more than an item is worth
to them”).
85
See Ku et al., supra note 84, at 100–02; Malhotra, supra note 84, at 140–42, 144–45.
For a more general discussion, see Deepak Malhotra et al., When Winning Is Everything,
HARV. BUS. REV., May 2008, at 78, 80–83. Interestingly, the authors note that competitive
arousal seems more likely when lawyers are involved in the process. See id. at 82. This
literature and its antecedents have been invoked to explain bidder overpayment in corporate takeovers. See id. at 78, 80, 83–84 (illustrating the impact of competitive arousal
through Boston Scientific’s acquisition of Guidant and the Redstone-Diller battle for Paramount Pictures); see also Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV.
597, 625–27 (1989) (discussing winner’s curse theory in the context of overpayment in
corporate takeovers).
86
See Stephen M. Garcia et al., Ranks and Rivals: A Theory of Competition, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 970, 970–72, 980–81 (2006).
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the first three—affect the financial services industry, particularly when
firms aim to dominate a new financial technology.
Connected to the psychophysiology of competitive arousal are
studies indicating hormonal effects. Testosterone, for example, is
linked to a variety of competitive behaviors including power seeking,
social dominance, reduction in fear response, i.e., the “desire to be
socially visible, influential, and dominating,”87 as well as financial risk
taking.88 The intuition that hypercompetitive firms select for high testosterone individuals, as evidenced by prior status achievement and
tendency to promote overconfident, risk-taking managers,89 suggests
that this effect will replicate and intensify once such people are
thrown into their probationary crucibles. Here, of course, we are connecting back to the psychophysiology of emotional arousal in risk
taking.
In turn, hypercompetition generates other organizational consequences. To meet high expectations, firms establish “stretch” goals,
which may lead to a more frequent aggressive and unethical behavior
as the risk of loss becomes more palpable, a form of loss aversion.90
Even without explicit goals and quotas, agents sensing competition
will likely set their own aspiration levels. There is a curious duality
here. The robust psychological phenomenon of loss aversion triggers
greater risk taking when, perhaps pessimistically, individual agents
87
Michael J. Zyphur et al., Testosterone-Status Mismatch Lowers Collective Efficacy in
Groups: Evidence from a Slope-as-Predictor Multilevel Structural Equation Model, 110 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 70, 71 (2009); see also Maurice Levi et al., Deal
or No Deal: Hormones and the Mergers and Acquisitions Game, 56 MGMT. SCI. 1462, 1463, 1476
(2010) (using CEO age as a proxy for hormone levels and discussing the impact of testosterone on acquisition activity, in particular withdrawn bids and tender offers). Although
there is a perception that this hormonal effect is largely found in males, evidence shows
that “alpha”-like behavior is found fairly equally between genders, based on relative testosterone levels within gender. See Zyphur et al., supra, at 71 (noting that despite its greater
presence in men, testosterone “has been shown to have an equivalent impact on social
dominance in both males and females after controlling for the difference” in gender-associated testosterone levels). That said, evidence of male cultural domination on Wall Street
is disturbingly substantial. See Christine Sgarlata Chung, From Lily Bart to the Boom-Boom
Room: How Wall Street’s Social and Cultural Response to Women Has Shaped Securities Regulation,
33 HARV. J.L. GENDER 175, 177–81 (2010).
88
See Coren L. Apicella et al., Testosterone and Financial Risk Preferences, 29 EVOLUTION
& HUM. BEHAV. 384, 387–89 (2008); J.M. Coates & J. Herbert, Endogenous Steroids and Financial Risk Taking on a London Trading Floor, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6167, 6170–71
(2008).
89
See Goel & Thakor, supra note 47, at 2745–50; Langevoort, supra note 46, at 288,
299–302.
90
See Lisa D. Ordóñez et al., Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of OverPrescribing Goal Setting 5, 9–13 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 09-083, 2009) (discussing the negative side effects of “stretch goals,” which include “shifting risk attitudes, promoting unethical behavior, and triggering the psychological costs of goal failure”);
Maurice E. Schweitzer et al., Goal Setting as a Motivator of Unethical Behavior, 47 ACAD. MGMT.
J. 422, 423–24, 429–30 (2004) (studying the impact of goal setting in motivating unethical
behavior when individuals fail to attain such goals).

2011]

CHASING THE GREASED PIG DOWN WALL STREET

1231

frame their decision in terms of the risk of falling short of expectations.91 On the other hand, to the extent that organizational or individual overconfidence blunts the fear of failure, the resulting
overconfidence implies excessive risk taking apart from any framing
effects.92 Calibrating the corporate thermostat to reduce the heat of
competitive excess is difficult without also cooling things down so
much that the firm loses its intensity and focus.
C. Dancing for the Crowd
Chuck Prince said that everyone must get up and dance,93 but
why? Perhaps it is the feeling of the competitive imperative just described, but dancing can also be performance art, meant for any number of audiences. The final reading I offer is the possibility that the
reason Citigroup and others were dancing so fast was because the
crowd—investors in the stock market—was demanding it.
Investment banks had shifted their ownership structure from private partnerships to public companies decades before the crisis.94
Hence, their stock prices were crucially important in terms of the net
worth of company insiders (whose compensation packages depended
on the stock price) and as a means of comparing them with their intense competitors.95 An inflated stock price would attract people and
create expansion opportunities; a depressed price would repel investment and make the firm a target.
If markets are efficient, their pricing rational and then their stock
prices generate a constructive discipline. If they are not efficient, the
discipline diminishes and may become dysfunctional. One branch of
behavioral finance studies potential market inefficiencies brought
about by some combination of animal spirits at work in supply and
demand and institutional constraints (e.g., short-sale restrictions) that
limit the opportunities for arbitrage as a corrective, and it analyzes
91
See Scott Rick & George Loewenstein, Hypermotivation, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 645,
645–46 (2008) (discussing hypermotivation, “a visceral state that leads a person to take
actions he or she would normally deem to be unacceptable,” and how it arises in response
to loss aversion and perhaps in response to unattainable or overly ambitious goals); see also
Langevoort, supra note 46, at 306–08 (discussing the “slippery slope” that leads to unethical behavior in CEOs who fall short of expectations and fear termination). Especially for
prominent firms, a period of high performance may ratchet up expectations so high that
improper behavior becomes the only way of avoiding falling short. See Yuri Mishina et al.,
Why “Good” Firms Do Bad Things: The Effects of High Aspirations, High Expectations, and Prominence on the Incidence of Corporate Illegality, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 701, 703–06, 715–18 (2010).
92
See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text.
93
Nakamoto & Wighton, supra note 62.
94
See Claire Hill & Richard Painter, Berle’s Vision Beyond Shareholder Interests: Why Investment Bankers Should Have (Some) Personal Liability, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1173, 1177–78
(2010).
95
See id. at 1181–86; Langevoort, supra note 46, at 294.
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how firms and their managers respond to these distortions.96 This
latter step may assume rationality on the part of the managers, or it
may not.97
Much has been written about the crisis that claims that stock market investors overvalued firms that threw themselves into the subprime
securitization and derivatives business, underpricing the risk.98 This is
contestable; critics like Posner point out that investors’ limited liability
and the moral hazard issues that explicit government guarantees
raised could incline them toward risk taking when they stood to make
money from taking the gamble.99 My own sense from the evidence is
that the stocks were mispriced because of irrational exuberance but
especially because the firms failed to disclose information necessary to
assess the risk properly. A recent article by Bill Bratton and Michael
Wachter contains a striking graph100 comparing the relative prices of
Countrywide (the most enthusiastic dancer in the bunch), Bank of
America, and JPMorgan Chase (by most accounts the also-ran, now
praised in hindsight as the smartest of the competitors).101 The dramatic price dispersion strongly suggests that the wilder the dancing,
the more excited the stock market reaction.
If so, this phenomenon created a dangerous incentive to which
the firms had to respond. Gillian Tett’s insightful book on J.P. Morgan,102 which in many ways invented the kind of synthetic derivatives
sold so freely during the frenzy but withdrew from the most lucrative
segments of the market later on,103 shows how the company was
threatened by its reticence. Its merger with Chase, not on the most
favorable of terms, was one such consequence, and the pressure grew
even stronger postmerger.104 Morgan’s competitors did far better, until the bubble burst.105 Even if we assume pervasive rationality on the
96
See e.g., Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Investor Sentiment in the Stock Market, 21 J.
ECON. PERSP. 129, 131–35 (2007) (discussing investor sentiment, mispricing of hard-to-arbitrage stocks, and reaction to mispricing by corporate insiders).
97
See, e.g., Malcolm Baker et al., Behavioral Corporate Finance, in 1 HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 147–48 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) (distinguishing research based on the “irrational investors approach” from the “irrational
managers approach”).
98
See generally sources cited supra note 54 (providing behavioral finance explanations
for crisis).
99
See supra notes 59–60 (criticizing psychology-based explanations for the crisis and
attributing it to risky, yet rational, self-interested behavior); see also POSNER, supra note 10,
at 85–86, 92–93 (discussing limited liability as a factor).
100
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 720 (2010).
101
See id. at 718–21 (describing Countrywide and JPMorgan Chase’s respective strategies and approaches to risk).
102
See TETT, supra note 63.
103
See id. at ix–x, 19–22, 51–56, 120–42.
104
See id. at 75–86, 120–42.
105
See id. at 140, 244–45; Bratton & Wachter, supra note 100, at 720.
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part of managers, an irrational stock market can produce distorted
behaviors if stock price becomes the metric to which the company is
managed.
If we relax the assumption of managerial rationality, these biases
become mutually reinforcing. It is worth revisiting Karen Ho’s ethnography of Wall Street banking, which stresses the extraordinary extent
to which the market and market prices become a fetish within the
culture.106 Her subjects insist that there is no truth but the market;
those things which the market prizes should be delivered instantly.
The primary form of rationalization was to claim the moral high
ground of shareholder value; the prime imperative is to maximize
stock price for the shareholders, thereby “reclaiming the ‘rightful’
capitalist unity between ownership (of stock) and control over corporations that they believe had been sundered during the heyday of
managerial ‘welfare’ capitalism, which in turn fosters the values of responsibility, efficiency, and individual proprietorship.”107 Importantly, this rationalization—a myth, really—was strong enough to
convince bankers that the same principle legitimately applies to their
own publicly-held employers, even when it threatens their own careers
through layoffs and downsizings.108 Perhaps the dance was simply its
ritual expression.
To a corporate law professor, this ideology is familiar, even
though as a matter of law it is grossly inflated. Shareholders are not
really owners even though they are residual claimants,109 and control
of the firm is in the directors’ hands with largely unreviewable discretion, which they are free to exercise in most states to the derogation of
short-term shareholder interests.110 Even Delaware courts have carefully avoided any endorsement of “manage to the market.”111
106

See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
See Ho, supra note 72, at 180; see also Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands
of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619,
1640–63, 1697–99 (2001) (describing the extent to which this view is widely held among
business people and also describing the effects on corporate governance).
108
See Ho, supra note 72, at 181–87.
109
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 563–64 (2003); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 100, at 662–65.
110
Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 109, at 568–74 (arguing that shareholder primacy “exists
in neither law nor fact,” but rather that “[p]rimacy within the corporation is vested in the
power of directors”).
111
See Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Policy and the Coherence of
Delaware Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 523, 523–30, 556–75 (2003) (arguing that in
regard to takeover defenses, Delaware courts employ a management-discretion model that
provides “managers with the freedom to ignore financial market valuations when setting
corporate policy”); see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 100, at 713 (discussing the legal
model of the corporation, which “imposes no duty to manage to the market when the
directors’ views about value differ from the market’s view”).
107
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But cultural myths are part of the grease, and fetishizing the market could well prompt the kind of focus and intensity that promotes
competitive success. Doubting the market and its pricing mechanisms
can be disorienting because there is nothing in its absence but human
judgment, over which there are endless, distracting arguments. We
should be cautious here, of course. Ho’s study investigates bankers
involved in mergers and acquisitions, and their script was specific to
that market niche. We know that investment bankers often doubt the
accuracy of market prices: hedge funds and proprietary trading desks
exploit pricing inefficiencies very profitably, and we know that some
of them privately turned bearish on subprime debt well before the
market turned downwards.112 Synchronicity does not imply respect
for other market players, and bankers notoriously display contempt
for lesser intellects, a category that often seems to include nearly everyone else in the world on matters of money and markets.113 My
sense, which we will explore further in Part IV, is that this cultural
belief about the legitimacy of markets and prices is mainly a normative
one—that the market deserves what it wants and gets—which is consistent with a culture that is also quite arrogant.
That said, the market as a scoreboard has an undeniable emotional pull. When the stock price rises abnormally for a firm or industry, it is hard not to construe it as an endorsement of its strategy and
direction, as part of a feedback loop that combines with internal cultural optimism and self-interest to reinforce the belief that this is the
right course of action. The market’s wild applause and the deep fear
that all performers have of disappointing the crowd surely fed Chuck
Prince’s.
IV
GOLDMAN SACHS AND GOD’S WORK
In a newspaper interview with The Times of London in August
2009, Goldman Sachs’ CEO, Lloyd Blankfein, said that he was simply a
banker “doing God’s work.”114 Presumably Blankfein meant this statement facetiously. If so, it was a good example of Wall Street’s public
relations learning disability, but in any event, it was as evocative and
112

See examples cited supra note 13.
See, e.g., HO, supra note 72, at 57 (“Central to Wall Street’s construction of its own
superiority is the corollary assumption that other corporations and industries are ‘less
than’—less smart, less efficient, less competitive, less global, less hardworking . . . .”); Ho,
supra note 72, at 186 (quoting a corporate finance associate who described the influence of
Wall Street on corporate America: “We’ve made everyone smarter. We know much more
about how global competition works, about how to create efficiency. . . . [W]e understood
shareholder value and strategy before anyone else”).
114
John Arlidge, Inside the Goldmine, TIMES (London), Aug. 11, 2009, (Magazine), at
12.
113
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infamous as Prince’s dancing reference. The irony became evident
soon enough when the SEC brought a high-profile deception case
against Goldman, accusing it of misleading a large German bank
(IKB) and the portfolio manager (ACA) about how a large synthetic
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) had been structured.115 By most
accounts, this case generated enough public resentment that the massive legislative reform work in Congress, which had stalled, restarted
in earnest.116
Many on Wall Street called the SEC’s case a cynical political
move,117 and as a legal matter, Goldman had plenty of strong defenses,118 most of which focused on the ability of IKB—a large, wellstaffed player in the securitization market—to understand the actual
makeup of the securitization portfolio it bought from Goldman.119 If
IKB and ACA were indeed misled, as the SEC claims, it raises a more
interesting set of questions about how institutional buyers behave
than why sellers might be tempted to take advantage of that behavior.
The federal securities laws are not particularly solicitous in cases of
imprudent reliance by a sophisticated purchaser.120
I am more curious about the psychological and cultural background to a transaction like this, on both sides. IKB may not be a
115
Complaint at 1–3, 11–17, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-CV-3229 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp21489.
pdf. Goldman settled with the SEC a few months later by agreeing to a record-setting
payment of $550 million. See SEC Litig. Release No. 21592 (July 15, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21592.htm. The thrust of the claim was
that both IKB and ACA were misled by not being informed that Paulson & Co., the initiating party that was taking the short side of the deal, had negotiated to include in the reference portfolio securities that it deemed particularly susceptible to the looming subprime
risk. Complaint, supra, at 11–19.
116
See Julie Creswell, Goldman Was Regulators’ First Prize, and It May Be the Last, N.Y.
TIMES, July 17, 2010, at B4; John E. Morris, The SEC Tests Goldman’s Teflon, THE SOURCE,
(Apr. 19, 2010, 10:18 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/source/2010/04/19/the-sec-testsgoldmans-teflon.
117
See Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Crowd with Pity for Goldman, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2010, at
B1.
118
See Zachary A. Goldfarb and Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Goldman Says Its Clients Knew
the Product, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2010, at A12.
119
See Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Confident on IKB Part of Goldman Suit, WASH. POST, Apr.
24, 2010, at A8 (“Much of the criticism of the SEC case . . . is that IKB and ACA were
sophisticated investors who knew what they were doing.”); see also Fareed Zakaria, Cross of
Gold, NEWSWEEK, May 3, 2010, at 24 (noting that IKB was “a large German bank that had
whole departments devoted to analyzing just these products” and that it “surely knew that
someone was betting against them” who thought they “were garbage”). But see Goldfarb,
supra, (“[G]overnment officials say that IKB came to Goldman for help explicitly because it
wanted objective advice on what to invest in, and that Goldman did not tell the German
bank that the product contained mortgages that Paulson believed would fail. So, SEC
officials say, it doesn’t matter whether IKB was a sophisticated investor or not because
Goldman did not provide the objective investment advice the German bank was seeking.”).
120
See C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws,
1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1086–94.

1236

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1209

perfect example of a risk-assuming buyer because it apparently transferred much of its interest in the CDO to smaller institutional investors, including many municipalities in the United States, through its
own special investment vehicle.121 It was thus something of a middleman, trying to profit from the spread. But there is enough to the story
to suggest that IKB can be treated as a purchaser that believed that the
risk was low enough relative to the expected returns to justify the
transaction. This interpretation brings us back to the two main possibilities: either its portfolio managers were deliberately ignoring the
risk because of their own compensation incentives, or the managers
underestimated the risk.122 From my reading of the complaint, the
SEC does not adduce any evidence to suggest that Goldman acted in a
fiduciary-like capacity with respect to IKB, which was a large part of
Goldman’s defense.
On the buy side, we have already considered some of the biases
that might lead to underestimation. One additional point deserves
emphasis. IKB regularly bought these kinds of securities and derivatives to fill a very large appetite for securitized debt.123 I suspect that it
had developed a routine associated with purchases that had become
somewhat habitual, with nothing but positive, profitable feedback
through early 2007. As we saw earlier, routines—especially when they
move to high velocity—take on a life and logic of their own, making it
hard to perceive the need to rethink at any particular moment.124 To
me, the most compelling aspect of the SEC’s case comes from the
appearance that Goldman’s salesman in the transaction, Fabrice
Tourre, was working fairly hard to convey the impression that nothing
was particularly new or unusual about this transaction, so as not to
trigger any pause or doubt in the buyer’s routine.125 If so, and in fact
there was something new or unusual that might give IKB pause, then
the SEC has a good bit of material with which to work. We would have
to know much more about what was said and what was understood to
judge.

121
See Carrick Mollenkamp & Laura Stevens, German Bank: Victim or a Contributor?,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2010, at C2; Nathaniel Popper, Main St. Paid for Wall St. Maneuvers,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2010, at B1.
122
See Mollenkamp & Stevens, supra note 121 (noting that “IKB proved an avid buyer
of much that Wall Street had to offer”).
123
See id. (chronicling IKB’s expansion into the CDO investment business, noting that
IKB had touted itself as a “leading investor in CDOs” in marketing materials).
124
See supra Part I.B. This is true in terms of ethics as well. See Francesca Gino & Max
H. Bazerman, When Misconduct Goes Unnoticed: The Acceptability of Gradual Erosion in Others’
Unethical Behavior, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 708, 709 (2009).
125
See Complaint, supra note 115, at 11–12, 16–17 (describing Tourre’s efforts to portray the Abacus portfolio as having been selected by an independent third party and his
efforts to conceal Paulson’s role).
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The sell side is more interesting. The criticism against Goldman
has been twofold: first, of its failure to give background information as
to how this particular CDO had been structured; and second, of its
failure to disclose the many respects in which the firm was by this time
(and maybe in this transaction itself, though that is far from clear)
starting to bet that real estate prices and the value of subprime mortgages were going to drop.126 I want to put aside the murky legal question of what the duty to disclose is in a situation like this. Instead, I
want to consider mainly the ethical and reputational risk that
Goldman took in the deal and imagine how it might have perceived
that risk internally.
Recall the claim that the bankers’ culture is of-the-moment and
bows to the innate legitimacy of the market mechanism, seeking an
unquestioning synchronicity with it. As I mentioned, this view probably cannot be construed as a belief in the unerring accuracy of the
market at any given moment so much as a Hayekian view of the necessary freedom of persons and firms to be tested in the crucible of the
marketplace.127 The market evolves toward accuracy and innovative
efficiency, but it only does so through trial and error in which rewards
and punishments are apportioned rigorously for good and bad
choices.
While I have difficulty calling this God’s work, I suspect that the
culture within Goldman did (and does) embrace this myth. When
Goldman defended itself in the press, it said that it was being a “market maker,” playing a central inventive role that assumes no moral or
ethical obligations to either side of the transaction.128 It was a manufacturer of market crucibles in which willing participants could test
their skills, knowledge, and mettle, with economic resources moving
to the winners. The marketplace’s willingness to compensate
Goldman handsomely for playing this role was a recognition of its intrinsic value and the legitimacy of its work. So construed, there is no
obligation (beyond a legal one) owed to anyone else129 that might be
126
See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Banks Bundled Debt, Bet Against It and Won,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A1.
127
For a short overview of F.A. Hayek’s views of the marketplace and spontaneous
ordering, see Kevin T. Jackson, The Scandal Beneath the Financial Crisis: Getting a View from a
Moral-Cultural Mental Model, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 771–73 (2010).
128
See Charlie Rose: Lloyd Blankfein, Chief Excecutive Officer and Chairman of Goldman Sachs
(PBS television broadcast Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://www.charlierose.com/view/
interview/10989. Goldman Sachs executives defended the firm’s actions similarly before
the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations. See Matthew Goldstein, Goldman’s More Than a
Wall Street Toll Collector, REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/
04/28/us-goldman-maker-analysis-idUSTRE63R5JA20100428.
129
For an example of such an assertion by Blankfein, see Goldstein, supra note 128
(“[Blankfein] said the firm’s only real obligation [when acting as a market-maker] is to
make sure that a transaction is ‘suitable’ for clients based on their level of sophistication
and financial means.”). During his interview with Charlie Rose, Blankfein distinguished
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distracting in generating deal flow. Simply be smarter, faster, and
stronger, and take the rightful spoils.
Once again, we have found a thick coating of grease. Doing
God’s work, even in reduced dosage, is a classic form of moral rationalization that facilitates corner cutting and rule bending.130 Excessive
anxiety about whether the means are right burdens the pace of economic innovation, which is the legitimate end that society should
want. Insiders seem to believe that as long as market players are acting by free will, those market players are on notice of the rules by
which the game is played, and those rules are not the least bit
paternalistic.
The problem with this mindset is that it is an ideology, not a
truth. Our society tends to acquiesce in it (and a great deal of lobbying by Wall Street seeks to assure the continued acquiescence)131 during good times, which can support the internal cultural belief in its
legitimacy for a sustained period of time. But downturns and crises
happen predictably, and investors and taxpayers facing losses of various sorts—and who do not feel personal responsibility for the poor
investment decisions that led to those losses—are not enchanted by
the social Darwinism in Wall Street’s “just making markets” defense
for actions that seem exploitative.132
Viewed through this newly recolored lens, the relationship between Goldman and IKB looks different, ethically but maybe legally,
too. “Fabulous Fab’s” egotistical celebration133 (and the bonus he
presumably expected) suggests to me that he was not just a table setter
inviting willing parties to a market transaction, but actively persuading
IKB to throw in its ante yet again. The act of salesmanship in highend settings is extraordinarily demanding and challenging because it
between the firm’s roles as advisor and transaction facilitator, with fiduciary obligations
and duties attaching to the former.
130
For more information on these rationalization processes as they pertain to financial
self-interest and wealth-based inequity, see Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, Dishonesty in the
Name of Equity, 20 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1153, 1153–54, 1159 (2009).
131
See Eric Lichtblau & Edward Wyatt, Pro-Business Lobbying Blitz Takes on Obama’s Plan
for Wall Street Overhaul, N.Y. TIMES, March 28, 2010, at A19 (“In the last decade, the financial sector has spent more money than any other industry to influence Washington policy—more than $3.9 billion, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.”).
132
Cf. Wall Street’s New Shape: Rearranging the Towers of Gold, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2009,
at 75, 76 (noting that despite Goldman’s claims about being a market-maker and its simultaneous roles as principal and agent, its huge profits in the first six months of 2009 “have
turned the media as well as the mob against it”).
133
For a summary of the most troubling of the Tourre e-mails released by Goldman
Sachs, see Steve Eder and Karey Wutkowski, Goldman’s ‘Fabulous’ Fab’s Conflicted Love Letters,
REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/26/goldman-emailsidUSN2516585020100426. The full text of the Goldman Sachs e-mails—including some of
those sent by Tourre—can be found at Goldman Sachs and the Financial Crisis, NYTIMES.COM,
http://documents.nytimes.com/goldman-sachs-internal-emails (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
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involves manipulating and managing desires, usually after building
some level of trust. That is why good salespeople are paid so much.
Confronted with salient evidence of damage resulting from a sale, ordinary people passing judgment in hindsight may tend to see the
salesmanship for what it is and blame the seller.
That is also why deeply-held cultural ideologies inside firms can
be risky, especially when they edge toward the God’s work frame. A
close look at the Enron scandal shows its unmistakable influence
there too: Enron exuded the greasy cultural ideology that making new
kinds of markets for energy would revolutionize the delivery of water,
electricity, and natural gas supplies globally.134 No one would ever
want to stop that headlong rush by telling the truth when that would
jeopardize financing arrangements, contracts, and other tools necessary to the desired end of marketplace success and the energy revolution.135 In fact, it is striking how many financial frauds took place
within industries undergoing a technological “revolution.” In those
revolutions, inflated self-confidence caused by early marketplace success joined with a destiny myth to override the constraints that reputation and law otherwise imposed.136
There are other cultural rationalizations as well. Cultures can
denigrate outsiders, including customers and competitors, by projecting onto them an inflated disposition for selfishness and guile,137
thereby justifying tit-for-tat exchanges. Rules of the game that are selfserving can be imagined as universally understood and accepted
through sports and military metaphors and imagery. The danger
point comes when a long enough time passes without the firm and its
people being called out on their self-deception because during that
time, the culture feeds on itself, and people rise up the ranks who are
its exemplars and cheerleaders and who are risk takers, too.138 More134

See BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE AMAZRISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 73–84 (2003); see also Donald C. Langevoort,
Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1, 2 (2004) (noting Enron’s transition to an “energy-based investment
bank . . . [from] a traditional supplier of natural resources”).
135
See Langevoort, supra note 46, at 287–88; see also Langevoort, supra note 33, at 91
(“[A]necdotal reports suggest that Enron’s culture was heavily premised on the sense that
technology-based changes in energy and related markets were such that ‘the rules had
changed’ in terms of how markets were structured and that the firm was involved in changing those rules in a ‘win–win’ way for Enron’s employees, investors and the American economy.”). This is a general theme in MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 134, at 114–22
(describing the impact of corporate culture on ineffectiveness of risk management).
136
See Langevoort, supra note 134, at 2–6 (2004) (arguing that technologically-based
innovation was a causal factor in notable corporate scandals of the early 2000s).
137
Cf. Langevoort, supra note 33 (discussing in-group culture and increased aggressiveness toward outsiders).
138
At the individual level (and probably cultural level as well), there is also the connection between transactional velocity and possible rationalization to consider, especially
when people are repeatedly put under moral stress. Cf. Nicole L. Mead et al., Too Tired to
ING
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over, the increasing presence of money and wealth in the immediate
surroundings tends to prompt more selfishness and the inclination to
rationalize by reaching to ideologies like these.139
Thus, we can take this back to the level of the individual, too.
One way that firms perpetuate belief systems is by selecting individuals
who are culturally compatible. In his famous ethnographic work on
business ethics, Robert Jackall describes the plasticity common to successful managers, a cognitive style that easily rationalizes away moral
doubt when it is competitively useful to do so, while also adhering to
the norms of in-group loyalty that may make the person seem, on the
surface, to be a cooperative team player.140 Plainly, firms select for ingroup loyalty traits but probably also for “flexibility,” to use the sanitized term for plasticity. There is a special danger here because when
ethically plastic contestants are put through a series of “probationary
crucibles,”141 innate, unconscious skill at plasticity is probably rewarded. Up-and-comers do have to be stars at teamwork and exhibit
genuine loyalty, but if they lack the willingness to do their fellows in by
finding a way to step in front when winners are being chosen after
each round, they probably will not move up.142 Those who get all the
way to the top are often quite gifted at rationalization and dissembling—a high Machiavellian style—carrying very little of the heavy
baggage of moral anxiety. Power, in turn, tends to increase moral
hypocrisy.143 That is another enterprise risk to put on the map.

Tell the Truth: Self-Control Resource Depletion and Dishonesty, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
594, 596–97 (2009) (finding that “[w]hen people’s self-control resources have been taxed
by a prior act of self-control, cheating increases” and discussing possible explanations).
139
See Francesca Gino & Lamar Pierce, The Abundance Effect: Unethical Behaviors in the
Presence of Wealth, 109 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 142, 152
(2009) (concluding that unethical behavior increases among laboratory subjects when
wealth is proximately displayed); see also Kathleen D. Vohs et al., The Psychological Consequences of Money, 314 SCIENCE 1154, 1156 (2006) (finding that money promotes self sufficiency and interpersonal disharmony).
140
See ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 203
(1988) (“Only those with an inexhaustible capacity for self-rationalization, fueled by
boundless ambition, can escape the discomfort such [ethical] compromises produce.”).
141
See id. at 192–93.
142
For a discussion of the impact of “negative activities” in the promotion process, see
Kong-Pin Chen, Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119, 120–34,
137–38 (2003).
143
See Joris Lammers et al., Power Increases Hypocrisy: Moralizing in Reasoning, Immorality
in Behavior, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 737, 738, 742 (2010). For a useful overview of moral hypocrisy
and the self-deception strategies that enable it, see C. Daniel Batson et al., Moral Hypocrisy:
Appearing Moral to Oneself Without Being So, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 525, 525–27,
534–36 (1999). Interesting research is emerging on the connections among moral decision making, utilitarian rationalization, and testosterone. See Dana R. Carney & Malia F.
Mason, Decision Making and Testosterone: When the Ends Justify the Means, 46 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 668, 670 (2010).
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V
INDIVIDUALS WITHIN CULTURES
This last point brings us back to the intersection of sociology, psychology, and economics. As noted earlier, it goes too far simply to
assume that organizational outcomes in risk taking are attributable to
an inchoate corporate culture without considering the ability of powerful individuals to intervene and take control of decision making,
perhaps to cause greater mindfulness—or perhaps to override mindfulness that might otherwise occur.144
The financial crisis gives us apparent examples of both, though
we have to be cautious in relying on the largely journalistic accounts
that have thus far appeared. One of the intriguing questions is to
look at financial firms that did not take on excessive risk compared to
their peers. JPMorgan Chase is the natural subject, because it was the
one big Wall Street bank with identifiable hesitancy to go as deeply
into synthetic mortgage-based derivatives as its competitors, and it suffered for a time as a result.145 Gillian Tett’s book, mentioned earlier,
deals with this question, and the answer she arrives at is complicated.
One explanation is cultural—Morgan’s history and tradition did value
somewhat greater conservatism and respect for risk,146 and the people
who ran the numbers and balked at holding the level of super-senior
debt that other firms were came from that culture.147 But how did
that culture persist as against the competitive pressures to adjust,
which are well described in the book and which the approach set
forth in my Essay suggests should dominate? The answer is at least
partly individual. At the point where the pressures were growing
strongest, Morgan brought on as CEO an outsider, Jamie Dimon,
whose professional background and experience led him to be particularly demanding that risk taking be justified rigorously and, ultimately,
willing to support the skeptics.148 Ironically, in light of our earlier
discussion, it might well have been his own inflated self-confidence
144
There is a substantial literature on the psychology of CEO’s and its influence on
corporate decision making and performance. See, e.g., Arijit Chatterjee & Donald C. Hambrick, It’s All About Me: Narcissistic Chief Executive Officers and Their Effects on Company Strategy
and Performance, 52 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 351, 375–78 (2007) (studying CEO narcissism in the
computer hardware/software industry and “find[ing] that narcissistic CEOs favor bold actions that attract attention, resulting in big wins and big losses, as well as wide swings between these extreme outcomes”).
145
See TETT, supra note 63, at 120–25, 139–41.
146
See id. at 80 (noting J.P. Morgan’s risk-averse culture and emphasis on shedding risk
prior to its merger with Chase).
147
See, e.g., id. at 125–128 (discussing Bill Winters, a lifelong J.P. Morgan employee,
and his recommendation to management to refrain from “open[ing] the spigots on its
[CDO] pipeline”).
148
See id. at 104–13, 120–25.
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that—when coupled with this idiosyncratic background—made him
less susceptible to either cultural or external pressures.
By contrast, an article on AIG’s London affiliate by Michael Lewis
suggests a very different dynamic.149 AIG Financial Products became
one of the largest global issuers of credit default swaps (CDS) tied to
CDO tranches (mainly comprised of subprime debt) before finally
backing off its aggressiveness just before the downturn.150 Joe Cassano led that group, and he performed acceptably in his job even
though he lacked deep financial expertise (he came out of back office
operations), so long as his supervisor at AIG headquarters was Hank
Greenberg, who had built the company.151 Greenberg was strongly in
control, which constrained Cassano. But due to unexpected legal difficulties, Greenberg was suddenly forced to resign, and in the course
of the turnover in New York, Cassano found autonomy.152 Having little sophistication at financial or risk management, Cassano drove the
division to generate revenue in response to the positive feedback associated with continued prosperity in the housing markets. His sin, according to Lewis, was his ambition and arrogance that led him in well
over his head, in ways that simply coincided with the economic and
cultural pressures toward growth and expansion, unchecked by
doubt.153

149
See Michael Lewis, The Man Who Crashed the World, VANITY FAIR, Aug. 2009, at 98,
137–39. An insider account of the failure of Lehman proceeds along similar lines, suggesting arrogance and incompetence at the senior executive level that walled itself off from
groups within the firm that were, allegedly, trying to highlight the excessive subprime risk.
See LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD & PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF COMMON SENSE:
THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS 124–30, 201–02, 223–25, 233–36
(2009). If so, this emphasizes two important points. First, there will never be one single set
of cultural perceptions in any large firm: there will potentially be many subcultures. Second, culture interacts with the economics of information and power dynamics: CEOs may
surround themselves with those tied to some aspects of the culture and not others. There
is an important litigation point here as well. Showing awareness of problems in one unit of
an organization does not as a practical matter demonstrate contemporaneous awareness of
risk elsewhere. On this interaction and the legal standards for attribution of knowledge,
see Langevoort, supra note 48, at 157–63. In other words, the fact that some Lehman or
Goldman Sachs traders were predicting and betting on a subprime downturn while others
in the firm were aggressively selling products that would be valuable only in the absence of
a downturn does not necessarily suggest intentionally wrongful behavior.
150
See Lewis, supra note 149, at 137–38 (detailing how American International Group
(AIG) FP’s consumer-debt CDS became dominated by subprime mortgages). AIG backed
off most of these trades by 2005. See Shefrin, supra note 54, at 242–43; Whitehead, supra
note 1, at 31–32.
151
See Lewis, supra note 149, at 136–37.
152
See id. at 137.
153
See id. at 139.
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CONCLUSION
This Essay offers a map to understanding organizational psychology and culture, for use by gatekeepers like lawyers, independent directors, and auditors. Its central claim is that both psychology and
culture can play important cognitive roles by offering insiders scripts
and schemas that simplify, coordinate, and motivate—essential elements of any business in a highly competitive marketplace. These
scripts and schemas need not correlate with a high degree of perceptual accuracy, especially in risk assessment; instead, some degree of
inflated confidence and diminished risk perception can be adaptive in
terms of promoting intensity and focus rather than disabling fear and
uncertainty. Firms that have this capacity are more likely to survive
competitive pressures; in turn, once they have survived and flourished, they are likely to overattribute their success to internal skills
and competencies, thus bolstering the prevailing belief system. Good
fortune over time—even if just a matter of being in the right place at
the right time—can bias perceptions considerably in this direction,
leading to the promotion of leaders who are both products of this
culture and mindset and evangelists for it.
This pattern is what gatekeepers should look for, though not necessarily what they will find. It is a heuristic, designed to help those
whose job it is—often as a matter of law—to help the firm make accurate risk assessments. No doubt a close, careful exploration of the
human inner workings of any business will expose ambiguity and banality that confounds the predictions of any mental model; all firms
are different, with unique politics, path dependencies, routines,
myths, and ever-changing situational pressures. But looking for and
worrying about ways in which overconfidence, emotions, competitive
pressures, ethical rationalizations, and an abundance of testosterone
might bias the assessment of financial, legal, and reputational risk is
necessary to manage those risks. At the very least, it instructs the gatekeeper not to fall prey to the illusion that because the company’s leadership displays evidence of loyalty and commitment, their perceptions
and inferences can safely be trusted. Intensity and passion can instead
be a sign that the greased pig is running loose.
To be sure, the gatekeepers’ right response to these possibilities
is far from clear. By no means am I suggesting that upon discovering
evidence of overconfidence or rationalization, the proper thing for a
board of directors to do is to try to induce more realism. That is like
trying to stop a fast-moving train simply by stepping in front of it, especially when the engineer is in a big hurry. Psychology and culture are
much too powerful to easily be altered, and my central claim is that,
on average, some lack of realism may well be a profitable, adaptive
course for a firm that faces intense competition. To the extent that
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the directors’ job is to promote the long-term financial interest of the
company and its shareholders, tolerating some organizational illusions may actually be the right decision. Moreover, trying to intervene
and monitor is very costly in both economic and human terms, signaling lack of trust that can have many unintended consequences.154
The places where skepticism and, if necessary, intervention are
required, however, are where the law demands objectivity in place of
profitability—mandatory disclosure requirements, for example—or
where there is a risk of catastrophic harm from the slippery slopes to
which illusions and rationalizations often give the initial downward
push. This is the cognitive dimension to enterprise risk management,
and responsibility here lies with the board and its advisers.155 One of
the messages here may be the extent to which independent directors
need more expert advice and resources of their own than is commonplace in most corporations. This is costly and perhaps awkward, to be
sure, and these costs have to be justified in light of how much objective risk there really is. That is something only the directors can
judge. Lawyers, with the corporation as client, have to recognize this
as well, and they must support the objective assessment against the
likely pushback from people who resent the lack of confidence in
their assessments. They have to be grit, not grease, even if carriers of
grit in organizations are an evolutionarily disfavored species.
Of course in offering these conclusions—indeed in drawing this
map—I have thus far ignored the obvious. Gatekeepers are people
too, and no less subject to psychological bias and cultural pressures
than anyone else. Many independent directors lack any motivation or
interest in objectivity, particularly because they have so little threat of
personal liability.156 It is hard work involving information not easily
accessible, and it can be unpleasantly confrontational. Because lawyers and accountants are generally chosen by management, they have
ample motivation to draw inferences in harmony with the inside
view.157 Psychological research has found evidence that auditors, for
154
See Arnoud W.A. Boot & Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate Performance: The
Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 356,
374–77 (2004) (noting reputational stigma monitors acquire from intervention); Claire A.
Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1792 (2006)
(“If monitoring causes officers to believe that they are strongly distrusted by the directors,
the officers might decide to live up (or more precisely, down) to that view when they are
not being monitored.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 96–100 (discussing possible negative effects of overly aggressive monitoring, including mistrust, cynicism, and decreases in
motivation, morale, and compliance).
155
See Michelle M. Harner, Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: The Role of Enterprise Risk
Management in the Economic Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 48–49 (2010).
156
See COFFEE, supra note 17, at 60–62.
157
See id. at 3–4, 64–67 (discussing auditors’ vulnerability to succumb to management
pressure to secure more lucrative consulting income).
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example, are prone to motivated inference—supporting management
in the exercise of accounting judgments—even after the formal conflicts of interest (such as selling ancillary services) are removed.158 Accounting quality seems to have gotten better since Sarbanes-Oxley,159
but this improvement may have occurred because the statute caused
the legally-mandated reordering of the auditor-manager
relationship.160
Lawyers are in a different position. As Mitt Regan has shown,
lawyers find themselves increasingly under hypercompetitive economic pressures, and the cultures of law firms have adapted in unsettling ways.161 Lawyers anxious to project an image of responsiveness
to client needs often talk about the process by which they decide if
they can “get comfortable” with what the client proposes. That process is fraught with psychological risk. My frequent interactions with
practicing lawyers have led me to the disturbing sense that grease
drips from the walls and ceilings of some law firms.
I am not naı̈ve, but I do not want to be naı̈vely cynical either. I
also know plenty of very good lawyers who worry about their clients’
objectivity, though maybe not in the way informed by research in psychology and sociology that we have surveyed here. We are likely moving to a period where legal and reputational risk increases, especially
in the world of financial services, making cognitive independence a
more valuable commodity. There are well-motivated directors, too,
though perhaps not as many as we would like; we know this because
independent directors are more willing to fire management and otherwise exert control when the situation demands than in the past.162
Auditors may be getting tougher as well.163
158
See Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibility of Auditor Independence, SLOAN MGMT.
REV., Summer 1997, at 89, 91–93.
159
See, e.g., Gerald J. Lobo & Jian Zhou, Did Conservatism in Financial Reporting Increase
After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial Evidence, 20 ACCT. HORIZONS 57, 71 (2006). (providing
evidence of increased conservatism in accounting judgments and financial reporting after
Sarbanes-Oxley).
160
See id.; see also COFFEE, supra note 17, at 342–43, 367 (discussing the importance of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s requirement that the auditor report to an independent audit
committee, which “substituted a risk-averse principal in place of often risk-preferring corporate financial executives”).
161
See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER
31–41 (2004); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Tournament at the Intersection of Business
and Legal Ethics, 1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 909, 915–22 (2004) (describing tournament theory as
applied to law firms and corporate lawyers and examining the efficacy of Sarbanes-Oxley
§ 307 in light of such dynamics).
162
See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987,
1029–32 (2010) (discussing the emergence of outside directors “as a power center independent of CEOs,” the declining tenure of CEOs, and the greater willingness of boards to
replace CEOs).
163
See supra notes 159–60.

1246

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1209

In light of the immense economic pain that the financial crisis
caused firms, their shareholders, and the public, maybe gatekeepers
are now more willing to think about the risks that come from too
much loyalty and intensity, not just the familiar risks from disloyalty
and sloth. True, no one has yet cinched the case for a psychological
or cultural explanation of why financial firms and institutional investors led us into the recent crisis; we still have to concede that maybe it
was entirely about agency costs and moral hazards. But even if we
estimate that the rational account is the more likely one, the possibility that it is wrong—that culture and psychology are robust explanations for excessive risk taking—is something that we should fit into
our expected value calculation in deciding the right strategies for responding to the carnage. If cultural and psychological forces are as or
more likely an explanation, then the need to attend to them is obviously that much greater.

